Alliances as means for stability within the international system; a comparative analysis of Czech and Russian diplomatic efforts from the end of the first World War by Maynard, Brendan P.
ALLIANCES AS MEANS FOR STABILITY WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM; A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CZECH AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FROM THE 
END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
BY
BRENDAN PAUL MAYNARD
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011
Champaign, Illinois
Adviser:
Associate Professor Carol Leff
ABSTRACT
With the emergence of the nation-state as the paramount political unit within the international 
system, alliances have become a key mechanism for the preservation of peace and stability. 
International relations theorists, while differing on the motives behind state behavior, agree that states 
seek to develop relationships with one another of a desire for security. Despite extensive research on 
the theories behind state behavior, little effort has been made to offer a comparative analysis of the 
diplomatic efforts of states such as Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and alterations in behavior 
following their dissolutions. In order to compete my study, I examine the two primary theories within 
the field of international relations, realism and liberalism, and apply them to the primary diplomatic 
efforts of Czech and Russian leaders following the conclusion of the First World War. I conclude that, 
while both states develop alliances during the immediate aftermath of the war which support realist 
thinking, they shift their behavior following the conclusion of the communist era in central and eastern 
Europe and begin to behave in a manner predicted by the liberal theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Alliances represent a key aspect of the international system. Without international partnerships, 
states would be left to pursue foreign policy outcomes unilaterally. Scholars of international relations, 
such as those who promote the realist and liberal theories, may disagree on the degree to which states 
may set aside their own interests in order to more fully cooperate with one another, but they agree that 
alliances allow for the introduction of certainty into an otherwise chaotic international system. 
Following the conclusion of the First World War, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union effectively 
emerge onto the world stage as independent actors. Each state thrust into a precarious situation, Czech 
and Russian leaders are forced to seek out partnerships which will ensure long-term security and 
stability. Through this work, the author will examine the two major theories in the field of international 
relations, liberalism and realism, and attempt to apply them to the diplomatic efforts of Czech and 
Russian leaders, beginning with the build-up to the First World War and continuing forth to the present 
day. The author will argue, that while elements of uncertainty remain in the international system, 
regional, supranational organizations such as the European Union offer a great deal of promise for the 
future of peace within the international system.
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2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Theoretical models assist in the comprehension of various phenomena in nature. Without them, 
scientists lack an important mechanism for predicting outcomes of experiments. The same concept 
applies in the study of international relations in that they allow for the formation of predictions 
regarding the behavior of state and non-state actors. Establishing a greater degree of certainly through 
behavior predictions allows domestic actors, both policymakers and researchers to work to develop 
international institutions which will spur the development of inter-state cooperation. Among theories on 
methods for conflict-prevention and management, liberalism and realism stand out as the most widely-
aceepted and studied.
LIBERAL THEORY
 Liberalism, according to Andrew Moravcsik, professor of politics at Princeton University and 
leading proponent of liberal inter-governmentalism, has developed as a major theory over the past two 
centuries for the explanation of the behavior of state and non-state actors within the international 
system. The liberal theory of international relations, as he explains in his work Liberalism and 
International Relations Theory, maintains three core assumptions: individuals and groups hold 
autonomous interests and compete to see their goals realized, domestic institutions which act to 
promote equality among social groups are of great value in the promotion of international stability, and 
state preferences, rather than state capabilities, determine outcomes inter-state relations (Moravcsik 7-
8, 27). Combined, the economic competition and democracy work to simultaneously increase the 
incentive for international cooperation and to increase the cost of engaging in military conflicts among 
society as a whole. 
As states are comprised of individuals and groups with differing, and often competing interests, 
sub-state actors act as the driving force behind international outcomes. The desires of sub-state actors 
thus determine the direction in which the state's foreign policy will be oriented. Therefore, if one 
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believes that international outcomes are not predetermined, but might be altered through changes in the 
state's political makeup, then the state may develop an interest in international cooperation out of a 
desire for mutual benefit with other states, rather than out of security concerns.
The malleability of the individual represents one of the primary concepts put forth by liberal 
theorists. While conflicts, both intrastate and interstate, are assumed by liberals to exist and to continue 
to do so, democracy and economic liberalism are considered to be powerful drivers for evolutionary 
social progress (9). Moravcsik writes that, “under circumstances of minimum individual rights and 
regulated competition, Liberals believe that political and socioeconomic development in the direction 
of greater wealth and security is possible” (9). Thus, liberals argue that the international system need 
not remain in indefinitely in its present form, but ought to be altered and perfected so that stability, 
cooperation, and mutual prosperity be increased. 
Moravcsik notes that competition represents a key component to the liberal theory of 
international relations. According to the liberal theory, political competition, best exemplified 
domestically by the democratic form of government, represents a critical mechanism through which 
international stability may be achieved. The national governments of all states represent a segment of 
their domestic societies (9). Through their national governments, autonomous domestic groups are able 
to control the manner in which the state interacts with other actors. Sub-state groups prioritize relations 
with some actors at the expense of others. Within a democracy, sub-state actors compete for the ability 
to shape the state's international orientation. In the absence of a peaceful competition for control 
through the democratic process, domestic groups may become more powerful and gain the opportunity 
to seek “rents” at the expense of weaker groups (8). Given the opportunity, the larger and more 
powerful group may take the opportunity to seek international outcomes which benefit itself, but at the 
expense of the rest of the domestic society. Within democracies, competition works to breed 
accountability and trust. As sub-state actors seek to gain power, those pursuing public office at the 
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national level must appeal to voters and elaborate upon their policies towards international institutions. 
The greater the competition, the more detailed those seeking office must become in order to 
differentiate themselves from their competitors. Electors, in the presence of a variety of options, are 
able to thus determine the state's foreign policy orientation through their selection of lawmakers. In 
such cases, lawmakers will thus face pressure to pursue international outcomes which will benefit 
society as a whole, rather than one particular group (17).
 Maintaining a democratic form of government alone does not preclude a state from 
participating in military conflicts, however. Even in democratic states, populations may be pushed to 
support military action, primarily if they believe that there exists a threat to national security. Within 
democracies, the general population elects candidates to represent their sub-state political unit at the 
national level. Candidates for political office often run on various issues related to both domestic and 
foreign policies. As a result, voters select the candidate with whom the consider best suited for the 
position, but with whom they may differ on particular issues, including those related to foreign policy 
orientation. Further, in order to develop an opinion regarding a particular international outcome, voters 
must demonstrate a willingness to become familiar with the issue. The less familiar with an issue, the 
more a voter may be persuaded to support an outcome based upon news received from domestic media, 
which may deliver unreliable information. Lacking a superior alternative, however, democracy, even 
with its flaws, works to share costs of conflict among social groups. 
While democracies may enter into military conflicts, they remain more likely to push for 
peaceful outcomes as the state's leaders are may be made to suffer for pursuing outcomes favorable to 
only small portion of the population. In the liberal view, states are more likely to push for peaceful 
outcomes when there exists a relatively equal distribution (22). Even in democracies, information may 
be manipulated by powerful non-state actors. Government transparency, therefore, represents a key 
measure for a democracy to be able to properly function. 
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Within democracies, Liberal theorists believe that economic partnerships promote international 
cooperation as private actors push states to work to establish favorable trade agreements with other 
states. Moravcsik argues that, for mobile economic actors, trade agreements negotiated by states are 
valuable as they allow greater access to new markets (27). Once the agreements are established, the 
non-state actors will maintain pressure on the states to maintain the partnerships. Once states have 
enacted more open trade policies and have put forth effort towards establishing international 
partnerships, the costs of defection increase. Thus, states maintain less incentive to break trade 
agreements, as renegotiation will risk alienating domestic interests and international partners alike. 
Economic liberalization does not work to the direct benefit of all domestic economic actors, 
When states establish tariffs and barriers to trade, those interested in establishing themselves in the 
local market, such as multi-national corporations suffer a disadvantage while local, smaller businesses 
benefit. As a result, states do not always pursue trade agreements which may benefit society as a whole. 
Economic liberalization does not always spur international cooperation, however, as even in 
democracies, the degree to which states are willing to cooperate on trade issues depends upon the sub-
state actor in control of the government (11). 
In the absence of an over-arching governmental body to regulate inter-state relations, Liberals 
argue that international institutions offer an alternative to the anarchy present in the international 
system, but in the event that a number of pre-conditions are met. Such pre-conditions include a 
commitment to “national self-determination, democratization, economic development, and popular 
commitment to supranational ideals” (32). While democracy and balance between social groups within 
states helps to facilitate international cooperation, international institutions cannot be effective until 
they are able to mimic the conditions found at the domestic level of a democratic society (32). Thus, in 
order to maintain the ability to act effectively, international organizations must establish a set of pre-
conditions for admission of non-members. 
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While Moravcsik expresses skepticism over the potential of international institutions, the 
European Union stands as a model of success at the regional level. The success of the European Union 
can be attributed to the fact that it holds itself to the standards which, according to liberals, must be 
maintained in order for an international organization to be effective. Prospective members must 
demonstrate a high degree of democracy, agree to accept the institution's laws and regulations, and 
commit themselves to supporting the institution's policies. Once in the organization, members may 
reach an agreement with other members to be allowed to opt out of certain laws, but they are largely 
bound to the EU's policies. Thus, when an international organization, such as the European Union may 
coerce potential members into all of its demands before begin the accession process, the organization 
greatly improves its able to function smoothly as a means for international cooperation. 
REALIST THEORY
Realism represents another of the most prominent theories in the international relations field. 
Hans Morgenthau, prominent German propoenent of liberal theory, offers ,through his work Politics 
Among Nations, six tenets of realist theory (Morgentau 55). His tenets are that realism grounds itself in 
objective laws that have roots in human natute, that power represents the primary interst in 
international politics, that what constitutes power may shift over time, that moral principles cannot be 
applied to state actions, that moral judgement may likewise not be applied to state actions, and that 
political realism stands distinctly apart from other schools of thought (55-62)
In order to understand realist international relations theory, one must first examine realist views 
towards human morality. Like liberalism, those who promote realism focus upon the question of human 
nature. Morgenthau, argues that, in contrast to liberals, realists place less faith in the inherent goodness 
of mankind and its ability to change for the better (Morgenthau 55). Rather, human nature remains 
static and lacks an aspect of malleability (55). Realists do not argue that humans are inherently evil in 
nature. Rather, they may even be said to be creatures inclined towards compassion and love. However, 
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the anarchical nature of the international system works to unleash the darker aspects of human nature. 
In order to achieve peace and security, leaders, through their states, must demonstrate a degree of 
selfish and aggressive behavior which they might not otherwise demonstrate.  
 Morgenthau further argues that, based upon the staticism of human nature, only empirical 
evidence should be considered in the formulation of an international relations theory (56). Thus, rather 
the way in which states should act, one should rely upon their actual behavior. In this, realists rely 
largely upon past actions of states to predict behavior. 
Within realist theory, the states are the prime actors. States are, of course, comprised of 
autonomous individuals and groups, but they use their domestic national governments to push their 
interests. As the main drivers of action on the international stage, states receive the majority of attention 
from realist scholars. In the realist view, there are no major effective bodies for the management of 
inter-state relations. 
Power acts as one of the key components of realist international relations theory. Morgenthau 
states that, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (64). In a world in which 
humans are inherently devious and selfish in an anarchical international system, states, the main unit of 
study, attempt to gain as much power as possible for the purpose of security. Without an international 
governing body to effectively manage inter-state relations, individual countries are left to secure their 
security through whatever means possible (Waltz 18). 
Morgenthau further argues that a focus on power allows to realists to avoid questions of motives 
and ideological preferences (57). Motives, by nature are difficult to pinpoint. In Morgenthau's views, 
motives are unwise to study, as they are may be unclear to observers and to the person acting alike. 
Indeed, the person acting may not understand the true effects of his or her actions (57). The individual 
will also only be able to rely upon the information available to him or her. Lacking full understanding 
of the circumstances of any given situation, the individual will attempt to secure his or her own 
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interests. Failing to comprehend the true motives of their adversaries, state leaders recognize that they 
must act own the behalf of their states alone.
 Power, while a central component of realist international relations theory, does not always 
come in the same form. While one may think power as refering to military might, Morgenthau argues 
that states use multiple methods to establish themselves as dominant actors (59). Indeed, economic and 
political influence may be used by states to establish a greater position of security and prestige. 
Security represents a primary concern for all states. Whether through coercion of other states, buildup 
of strength, or the formation of alliances, individual states will always seek to create stability for 
themselves in an anarchical international system.
Morgenthau argues that no theory can completely explain the actions of states within the 
international system (57). While humans are rational, they sometimes lead states to act in ways which 
are irrational and not in the best interests of the people of said state. Regardless, Morgenthau argues 
that, at the present time, the realist theory offers the best explanation for the behavior of states and 
should be used to guide leaders in their actions. Inter-state alliances represent one of the most critical 
aspects of realist theory. Due to the unpredictability of the international system, states rely upon 
alliances for security.  Alliances, according to realists, rely upon the main aspects of realist theory, 
which include the study of power, the nature of states within an anarchical international system, and 
human nature and their effects on inter-state relations.
In a realist argument for international cooperation, Robert Jervis, a notable scholar and 
defensive realist, states that, 
“both realism and neoliberalism start from the assumption that the absence of a sovereign 
authority that can make and enforce binding agreements creates opportunities for states to 
advance their interests unilaterally and makes it important and difficult for states to cooperate 
with one another” (Jervis 43).
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In the absence of a global governing body, agreements must be reached in order to maintain a sense of 
order between states. Realists and neoliberals agree on the need for international cooperation in order 
for peace and stability to be maintained, but differ in their levels of confidence in international 
institutions. While neoliberals remain optimistic about the potential for cooperation and continuously 
search for new institutions through which order may be further established, realists are generally 
pessimistic and tend to believe that what can be achieved has already happened (47). 
Further, realists, defensive realists in particular, tend to argue that many conflicts between states 
are unavoidable, due to misinterpretations of the actions of other states (Jervis 50). Whether states act 
out of a desire to their increase their security or out of a desire to dominate plays a significant role in 
how other states may mitigate the conflict. Jervis believes that when state's out of fear for their security, 
they are more likely to be interested in avoiding conflict and maintaining the status quo. If a state acts 
as an aggressor, conflict will likely not be avoided (53). 
Jervis further argues that the creation of alliances reflect efforts by states to modify the 
anarchical nature of the international system. In particular, mechanisms which increase the cost of 
defection are considered most critical to maintain of order (56). For realists, costs of defection are what 
help to maintain alliances. The higher the costs, the more members of a partnership may feel confident 
that fellow members will be unwilling to disrupt the arrangement. Even offensive realists, who appear 
to place hardly any confidence in international partnerships, believe that institutions may be effectively 
when they are binding and require a solid commitment from states. However, even in such cases, the 
alliance will exist for so long as the initial impetus remains. Realists often argue that all alliances and 
international organizations may ultimately be dissolved as they are not autonomous institutions, but 
rather extensions of the states (Waltz 24). The leaders of the world's governing organizations are 
selected by the states or are the leaders of the states themselves. 
Jervis notes, however, that when organizations become “self-binding,” they develop the 
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potential for significant cooperation between states. Once international organizations, such as the EU 
are created, they may lead to dramatic unforeseen changes in the international system (62). More 
specifically, international organizations may push states to change their preferences, which will change 
outcomes achieved. As states begin to understand the possibilities of what they may achieve through 
the organizations they join, they will alter their preferences to better utilize their opportunities. States 
within organizations such as the EU begin to shape their policies with the EU in mind. When dealing 
with non-EU members, they now recognize that they may use the power of the organization to their 
advantage. In Waltz' view, the same concept applies to NATO. While the organization has not 
transformed the governments of its member-states, it has influenced the members in such a manner 
than the alliance would only be with difficulty dissolved (Waltz 20). The newer members of the 
organization have no interest in seeing it disbanded and it has transitioned from being a defensive 
alliance to an all-purpose military partnership. When organizations are capable of influencing and 
altering the preferences of their members, they may work to increase inter-state cooperation. In this, 
Jervis argues that the theories of defensive realism and neoliberal appear similar (Jervis 55).
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3. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CZECH REPUBLIC
ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
 In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Empire emerges as a restructured entity out of the lands held by 
the Habsburg monarchy (Wallace 26). While the Magyars receive equality with the Austrians within the 
Empire, the Czechs receive nothing (27). Frantisek Palatcky, Czech nationalist and hero of the 1848 
Czech revolution, recognizes that the establishment of a dual empire will allow for Hungarian 
(Magyar), in addition to Austrian, domination of the Slavs (26). However, the Czechs have little 
leverage when Emperor Franz Joseph  moves to address threats within his empire. As the Magyars 
represent the greatest threat, they are granted equality in exchange for abandonment of calls for 
independence (27). Despite, the setback, however, the Czech nationalist movement begins to pick up 
steam (38). Without prospects for an independent state, clear political divisions exist within the Czech 
lands. For the Germans of Bohemia, later the Sudeten Germans, annexation by Germany represents the 
best option moving forward. In their view, German unification failed in that it stopped short of 
including Bohemia within a greater Germany (Mamatey 77). For some Czechs in Bohemia, however, 
unification with neighboring Slavic peoples represents a better alternative. Nationalists such as Karel 
Kramar, leader of the Young Czech party, go so far as to appeal to the Russian Tsar for protection from 
potential German domination (77). Even leaders such as  Masaryk, later the first President of 
Czechoslovakia, do not go so far as to promote the idea of Czech independence before the First World 
War (78). The Czechs at this time continue seek greater autonomy, but the idea of independence has yet 
to develop (78). 
The First World War provides the impetus to independence for the Czechs of Bohemia. 
Recognizing the fragility of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czechs begin to dream of liberation by 
the Russian Empire and, eventually, of an independent Czechoslovak state (80). Within Russia and 
France, Czech and Slovak representatives not only attempt to persuade leaders of the need to push for 
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recognition of Czechoslovak independence, but local Czechs and Slovaks take up arms to join the fight 
against the Austro-Hungarian Empire (81). In the Russian Empire, in particular, a thousand men from 
the Czechoslovak community form a Czechoslovak unit within the Russian army and immediately 
begin to impress with their bravery on the battlefield (Wallace 109). Despite the success, however, the 
Russian tsar remains reluctant to authorize an increase in the force, as he fears demands for increased 
Czechoslovak autonomy within his empire (109). By 1917, out a need for troops, the French also agree 
to allow the creation of a Czechoslovak military unit (111). Americans take less of a military role, but 
recognize the need for placing pressure upon leaders of the major powers. Indeed, a Czech living in the 
United States, Jan Janak becomes of the first to put forth the idea of an independent state of the Czechs 
and Slovaks (Mamatey 84). Recognzing that the major powers are unlikely to push for a Czechoslovak 
state through their own will, Janak begins a major campaign to petition governments and draw attention 
to the cause (84).
More important than the efforts of Czech immigrant communities abroad, however, are the 
efforts of those who had been living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself and understood the reality 
of the situation. Forced to live in exile in order to avoid arrest by Austro-Hungarian authorities, 
Masaryk, later joined by Edvard Benes and Milan Stefanik, in 1915 in Paris creates the Czechoslovak 
National Council in order to formally promote the Czechoslovak cause for independence (84). As 
leaders, Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik prove quite skillful at promoting the Czechoslovak cause among 
the leading Allied states. Indeed, by early 1917 the Allies declare that they intend to include liberation 
for the Czechs and Slovaks as one of their post-war goals (86). In response, new Habsburg Emperor 
Charles quickly moves to restore revoked rights to the Czechs and Slovaks in an effort to preserve his 
empire (86). His efforts to achieve leniency from the Allies are initially successful, but prove fruitless 
when Austro-Hungary ultimately cannot break ties with Germany (86). On October 27, 1918, with the 
war having reached its conclusion for Austro-Hungary, Emperor Charles requests an armistice with 
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between his empire and the Allied states (87). Such a decision opens the door to Czech independence 
and, on the following day, the Prague National Committee declares that an independent Czechoslovak 
state has been established (87).
Despite the declaration of an independent Czechoslovakia by the Committee, the state's status 
remains tenuous. In particular, while the state at this point legal exists, it maintains an undefined 
territory (Wallace 128). Lacking a strong military force with which the Czechs may establish control 
over their new territory, they receive permission from the Allies to raise a new force under French 
command (131). The Czechs understand that the peace conference at Versailles represents the medium 
through which they may push the great powers of England, France, and the United States for 
recognition of their territorial claims but, even before the conference begins, danger lurks in the form of 
irredentist Hungarians desiring a restoration of the Hungarian kingdom (131). Czechoslovak troops by 
December 1918 occupy the Czech Lands, but are repulsed when they attempt to take Slovakia from the 
Hungarians (131). With French pressure, however, the Hungarians withdraw from Slovakia and, by the 
end of the year, the Czechs control both the historic Czech and Slovak lands (132). 
The peace conference at Versailles, which begins in January 1919, presents Czech leaders with 
the opportunity to present their territorial claims to the victorious powers (133). France, in particular, 
emerges as a major promoter of the idea of newly-independent Czechoslovakia as a major ally in 
central Europe (133). While the Americans demonstrate a reluctance to accede to Czech territorial 
requests, the British press for inclusion of Slovakia in the new Czech state, insisting that the new state 
requires internal rail communication (131). Largely, however, the French act as the primary supporters 
of Czech territorial claims at the peace conference.
Even before the conference concludes, threats to the territorial sovereignty of the new 
Czechoslovak state emerge. Prior to the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, which establishes a peace 
between Hungary and the Allies, the Hungarians and Czechs clash militarily over Slovakia, with the 
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Czechs holding the line only with the support of the Allies (134). Trianon settles the question, at least 
temporarily (134). While the Czechs struggle to keep hold of Slovakia, Poland pushes its own claim 
towards the city of Tesin, which acted as a major coal supplier for central Europe and an important 
stopping point on the rail-line connecting the Czech and Slovak sections of the new Czechoslovak state 
(134). Unwilling to wait for the decision of the major powers, the Poles move quickly  and seize two-
thirds of the town (135). The Czechs attempt to retake Tesin by force, but lose credibility among the 
members of the peace conference in the process (135). While the great powers may have favored the 
Czech claim for the town initially, support shifts to the Polish side (135). Ultimately, the great powers 
award the railway and the coal mines to the Czechs and the village to the Poles (135). As with Trianon, 
however, the question of possession remains only temporarily closed as the will not give up their claim 
easily (135). 
FRANCO-CZECH ALLIANCE
French support for Czechoslovak territorial claims during the Versailles peace conference 
establishes France as one of the most powerful and influential states with whom the young state may 
turn to in an effort to build partnerships and, in 1924, the two sides sign their first treaty (Wallace 160). 
As scholar David Vital notes, “A small nation, [Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes] 
reasoned, surrounded by lesser and greater enemies, needs great friends” (Vital 37). The partnership 
between the two French and Czechs develops because, as a realist would predict, the two states 
maintain a common concern, a resurgent German military power. 
In an effort to attract France's aid, Czechoslovak leaders work to play up the small-country's 
strengths. Promoting the country's expanding military and advantageous geographic location, Masaryk 
and Benes attempt to present France with an irresistible offer of friendship ( 38). Ultimately, France 
agrees to an alliance with Czechoslovakia, but on their terms. Czechoslovakia, as the smaller and 
weaker state, recognizes that, while France expects that the Czechs will enter into any Franco-German 
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war, Paris will not attempt to actively assist in any conflict between the Czechs and the Germans (38). 
Rather, should a military conflict arise between Czechoslovakia and Germany, France will declare war 
upon the Germans and will attempt to divide and weaken the German forces. Ultimately, however, 
Czechoslovakia must fend off the remaining German military units (38). The Czechs are generally 
satisfied with the agreement, as it does not conflict with other obligations, such as their participation in 
the Little Entente (Wallace 161). The agreement with France merely allows the Czechs to shore up their 
defenses against a potential revisionist power on their western border (161). In the 1920s, due to their 
trustworthiness, the French may be considered to offer as solid a commitment as any state. Thus, the 
Czechs feel confident that they will receive assistance in conflict with the Germans (161).
By 1938, however, the French abandon the partnership with Czechoslovakia. Concerned more 
with preventing another war than upholding the agreements reached in the Versailles Treaty, the French 
and British make clear their willingness to sacrifice Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity to German 
demands (38). The Czechoslovak leaders argue that the British and French put themselves in danger by 
allowing the balance of power on the continent to be upset, but their arguments fall upon deaf ears (38). 
In 1938, believing that the Franco-Czech alliance could be saved, Czechoslovak leaders agree to British 
and French demands that the Sudetenland be allowed to potentially secede from Czechoslovakia and 
become part of Germany. Thus, Vital argues that the Czechs at this time realize that the French, with 
whom they had maintained a tenuous alliance, have since turned against them and have begun 
pressuring them on behalf of the Germans (42). Thus, the Germans are free to make a move upon 
Czechoslovak lands. The French, formerly partnered with the Czechs, decide that they must accede to 
German demands in order to save themselves (55). 
In allying with the French, the Czechs recognize the weakness of their position as a young state. 
France, in particular, represents a state similarly interested in opposing German revisionism. Therefore, 
a particular mutual interest acts as an impetus to the formation of an alliance between the two states. As 
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a realist would predict, the two states attempt to reduce uncertainty by maximizing their power through 
promises of mutual assistance in a time of crisis. The terms of the alliance favor the French as the 
stronger state, but the Czechs, out of a need for security, are willing to take any offer of aid. 
SOVIET-CZECH ALLIANCE
The Soviet Union in the 1920s represents another of Czechoslovakia's most powerful major 
partners in the international area. William Wallace notes that, due a history of friendship and a common 
Slavic heritage, the development of a partnership ought to have been relatively easy  (Wallace 162). 
During the struggle for independence, Masaryk had appealed to the Russian Empire for support and 
had achieved, with the tsar's permission, the establishment of the Czechoslovak legion as a unit of the 
Russian army (111). Kramar, a prominent Czech nationalist prior to the First World War, had exhibited 
“Neoslavic” views and viewed the Russian Empire as a potential source of support for the Czech cause 
(59).  However, the Soviet Union, for ideological reasons, presents a different challenge.  Vital notes 
that, while many argue that Benes, by this time President of Czechoslovakia, did not wish to see his 
state ultimately fighting with the Russians against the German threat, he continues to maintain contact 
with Moscow in order to keep alive a potential source of assistance (Vital 55). Despite his opposition to 
the Soviet form of government, Benes recognizes that the Czechoslovak state must seek major allies 
wherever they may be found (Wallace 196). 
In 1934, despite his personal attitude towards Bolshevism, Benes persuades the Czechoslovak 
government to officially recognize the Soviet Union (196). The French, also concerned with the 
growing German threat, form an alliance in May 1935 (196). Two weeks later, the Czechoslovak and 
Soviet governments follow suit (196). Thus, by connecting the two pacts, the Czechoslovak enters into 
a tri-partite alliance with France and the Soviet Union. The Czechs already maintain an alliance with 
the French, but Soviet participation works to further strengthen their hand with regards to Germany. 
As with the alliance with the French, the Czechs represent the weaker partner within the pact. 
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The Soviets promise to aid Czechoslovakia in the event of unprovoked aggression, but only so long as 
the French do so first (197). As a result, while the Czechs achieve a diplomatic victory in the 
conclusion of a tri-partite pact, they must rely upon continued commitment by the other members to the 
pact for the agreement to fulfill its stated purpose. Ultimately, relations between the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia collapse due to circumstances which are largely out of Czech control. 
International relations historian Jonathan Haslam argues that relations between Poland and 
Lithuania help to push the Soviet Union to maintain a more neutral stance (Haslam 444). Poland, 
having threatened Lithuania militarily over its refusal to reestablish diplomatic relations following the 
Polish seizure of Vilnius, acts as a obstacle to the development of Czech-Soviet relations. The Soviet 
Union, acting as Lithuania's guardian, refuses to disturb relations with Nazi Germany, which similarly 
allies itself with Poland (444). Thus, Haslam notes that, wary of facing an angry Germany alone in the 
future, the Soviet Union shrewdly backs off a commitment to the defense of Czechoslovakia (444). 
When pressed by the Czechs for a firm commitment in the event of a war with Germany, the Soviets 
respond that they are obligated only to provide aid and, even then, only in the event that the French do 
so first (444). By 1938, the tri-partite alliance begins to falter as the French demonstrate a lack of 
commitment to the development of genuine cooperation within their pacts with both the Soviet Union 
and with Czechoslovakia (447). The Soviet Union does not abandon the pact, however, but rather 
attempts to save it by attempting to block any compromise made between the Powers at 
Czechoslovakia's expense by moving to draw Poland and Romania away from Germany's circle of 
influence (451). Ultimately, howver, the French and British betray Czechoslovakia at the Munich 
conference (Wallace 209). Following the conference, Soviet policy remains that holding the line would 
have acted as a powerful counterweight to Hitler's agression and forced him to reconsider his planned 
conquest of Czechoslovakia (Haslam 456). But, according to the tri-partite agreement, the Soviets are 
obliged to participate only in the event of a prior French offer of assistance to the Czechs. 
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As with the French, the Czechs are willing to take any offer of Soviet aid in a conflict with 
Germany. Despite the tenuous offer of aid, the Czechs, as the smaller power, lack leverage and are 
persuaded into taking the deal. The Soviet-Czech certainly represents an alliance supportive of realist 
theory in that, while Czech leaders maintain a negative attitude towards the Bolshevist nature of the 
Soviet state, they place greater value in maintaining their independence. Thus, they are willing to put 
aside their differences for the sake of mutual security. 
LITTLE ENTENTE
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Czechoslovakia recognizes that dangers to 
its independence lurk for the young state if it does not work to develop partnerships directed at securing 
its territory. Hungarian claims towards Slovakia present one of the most immediate threats to 
Czechoslovak state security (158). In an effort preserve its security, the Czechs turn two of the other 
states which had been formed out of the ruins of the Habsburg Empire, Romania and Yugoslavia 
(Wallace 158). The agreement reached to an establish a partnership, formalized over the course of 1920 
and 1921, emerges rather naturally, as all three states fear the potential outcome of a potential 
restoration of the Hungarian monarchy (Wandycz 552). Romania initially demonstrates a tepid attitude 
towards the creation of an alliance with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia but, following two attempts by 
Charles Habsburg to regain the Hungarian throne, changes its position and signs on to the partnership 
(556).
The concept of an alliance between three states with a similar interest, namely the rebuttal of 
potential Hungarian interest, while sound, only works so long as the members of the alliance maintain 
the common interest. The Little Entente falters when the leaders of the participating states move to 
develop a more inclusive partnership. Czechoslovakia during this period continues to maintain cold 
relations with neighboring Poland. Although Masaryk had hoped that relations between the two states 
would develop following the end of the First World War, differences over Tesin, relations with the 
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Soviet Union, and the political status of Hungary act as barrier to friendship between the two sides 
(Wallace 158-159). Benes believes that Poland may act as an ally against a possibly resurgent 
Germany, but productive relations fail to develop (159). The Czechs sign a peace pact with Poland in 
1921, but make clear their desire to keep relations between the two states separate from Little Entente 
business (Wandycz 557). Regardless, Yugoslavia and Romania push for the inclusion of Poland or 
Greece in an expanded Entente (557). The inclusion of Poland in an expanded alliance, while 
detrimental to the Czech desire to maintain the Little Entente solely directed against Hungarian 
revisionism, would offer an assurance to the Romanians, dealing with their own Soviet problem (556). 
Expansion would weaken the alliance as a whole, however, as it would add Poland's foreign policy 
problems to the fold and would potential require states such as Czechoslovakia to rise up against states 
with which it wishes to build relations, such as the Soviet Union (Wallace 162). The inclusion of 
Greece, for its part, threatens to weaken the alliance as it would force the group to become involved in 
Balkan affairs, an interest which the Czechs maintain no interest in pursuing (Wandycz 557).
Ultimately, the 1920s may be characterized as a decade of disunity for the members of the Little 
Entente. While the alliance itself holds, the diplomatic efforts of the individual states work to agitate 
relations between the three members (Wandycz 558). In 1933, however, the three agree to a further 
internal strengthening of the bloc. The Statue of the Little Entente creates a permanent council of 
foreign ministers, an economic council, and a permanent bureau (558). Despite efforts to unify the 
foreign policies of the members of the bloc, the alliance begins to fall out apart within the next few 
years (559). 
 Benes, in an effort to assist France in regaining credibility after it fails to prevent resurgent 
Germany from entering the Rhineland in 1936, proposes to the other members of the Little Entente a 
defensive pact (Wandycz 560-561). Benes suggests that the members of the alliance unify not only 
against Hungarian aggression, but against unprovoked aggression by any state (561).  In September 
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1936, Yugoslavia signs treaties with Germany and Italy, effectively breaking up the Little Entente 
(Wallace 199). 
Czech efforts within the Little Entente support the realist that alliances are viable so long as 
they continue to serve a singular purpose. The Little Entente, in theory, represents a strong mechanism 
through which states fearing irredentism, as the Czechs, Yugoslavs, and Romanians fear from Hungary 
at this time, may unify to nullify the threat. The alliance fails, however, to evolve into an alliance which 
may effectively function, against Hungary or against any threat (564). As the three members of the 
Little Entente pursue independent foreign policies, as Czechoslovakia does with the Soviet Union, or as 
Yugoslavia and Romania promote the idea of expansion, as they do when they push for the inclusion of 
the case of Poland and Greece, the cohesiveness of the alliance weakens and the states make 
themselves more vulnerable to the threat against which they had originally intended to oppose. 
ORIGIN OF CZECH REPUBLIC
The year 1989 represents a pivotal moment in the history of Czechoslovakia as an independent 
actor on the international stage. November in particular, sees an explosion of resistance against the 
oppressive communist government,  which has been in power since 1948 (Panek 589). Following a 
harsh crackdown on a student protest on November 17th, the students contact intellectuals and others 
opposed to the government in order to spur the public to action. The students manage to attract others 
to the cause and by the end of the month, large protests break out across the country (589). The 
communist government attempts to maintain control, but falters under the pressure of the protesters. In 
order to assuage the protesters, sympathetic communist Prime Minister Marian Calfa offers the 
presidency of the state to Vaclav Havel (591). In order to ensure that Slovak interests do not go 
unrepresented, Alexander Dubcek, the hero of the Prague Spring of 1968, becomes the Speaker of the 
Federal Assembly, over which the communists maintain control (591). On January 23rd, citizens of 
Czechoslovakia receive freedom in the form of free, pluralist elections (593). 
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Internationally, the newly-named Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) reemerges from 
behind the Iron Curtain and declares a desire to become part of a more united Europe. The Soviet 
Union, which, unlike in August 1968, does not intervene and attempt to disrupt the liberalization 
process, and the CSFR sign a pact of withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1990, thus ending the 
occupation of the Czechoslovak state by its ally, the Soviet Union (594). At this time, Czech leaders 
envision a new security organization, which will include most of Europe, as they believe that NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, the primary defensive organization of the communist states of central and eastern 
Europe, will eventually be dissolved (594). Already by June 1990, the CSFR and the other communist 
signatories of the Warsaw Pact reach an agreement to disband the alliance (594). 
EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Immediately following the Velvet Revolution, which leads to the downfall of the communist 
government in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak becomes determined to rid itself of the influence of 
the Soviet Union. Having been occupied by Warsaw Pact forces since 1968, the removal of foreign 
forces from Czechoslovak territory is an immediate priority (Baun 8). The Czechoslovak government 
proposes a new, pan-European security structure which would replace the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the primary defensive alliance among western European states, but, having 
almost no support from other European states, the Czechs decide to push for integration into the 
existing regional European security and economic organizations (8). In 1991, President Havel declares 
that the CSFR has changed its foreign policy outlook and will attempt to become a member of NATO 
(Panek 610). Scholars Michael Baun and Dan Marek argue that the Czech Republic, having 
experienced domination for centuries by larger powers, seeks to join both the EU and NATO in order to 
safe-guard its newly-earned status as a fully independent state. The state seeks to not only protect itself 
from future military threats, but also protect its small, weak economy from domination by larger states 
(Baun 3). The Czech Republic aspires to become a full member of NATO in the wake of the fall of 
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communism in eastern and central Europe as it came to believe that the military backing of the United 
States will offer still greater protection from future threats (4).
Also at this time, in order to increase their attractiveness to the major European organizations, 
the Czechs form, together with the Poles and Hungarians, the Visegrad Group, which acts an institution 
designed to promote cooperation between the three states (9). While President Havel and Czech leaders 
demonstrate an idealistic attitude towards the prospects of European security and prosperity in the years 
immediately following the end of the communist period, the government's position sharps shifts with 
the emergence of Vaclav Klaus as prime minister. Demonstrating a strong realist streak, Klaus displays 
a far more skeptical attitude towards the European prospects of the Visegrad Group, which now 
includes independent Slovakia, and the idea of integration into the European Union (10). The state's 
official desire to become a member of both the EU and NATO remains, but the reluctance of Klaus 
emerges as a new obstacle to rapid accession (10). Incidentally, Klaus, despite his skeptical attitude 
towards the EU, demonstrates through his actions that he believes that the Czech Republic should not 
be held back by the other members of the Visegrad Group in its accession efforts (10). Klaus' 
government, through its negative attitude towards Euro-integration, manages to damage relations with 
the Czech Republic's neighbors, including Germany, upon whom the Czechs would rely for support in 
the state's bid to become a member of the EU (11). Regardless, the Czech Republic, along with Poland 
and Hungary receives an invitation to join NATO in 1997 and joins in March 1999 (11). The Czech 
Republic, thus, through its inclusion in the defensive zone of NATO, secures its territorial position. 
NATO does not guarantee that the Czech Republic will never be attacked by another state, but offers as 
solid a guarantee of protection as the Czechs might have reasonably expected to have. For a small state 
such as the Czech Republic, the alliance represents a very valuable asset in terms of security. 
Accession to the EU, however, remains the Czech Republic's main priority (12). Political 
Science professor Michael Baun notes that, as early as December 1989, the Czechoslovak government 
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declares its interest in becoming a member of the European Union (8). By 1991, the Czech Republic, 
then the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, begins preparing, in keeping with the organization's 
policy, to join the European Union (13). As a pre-condition for admission, the EU requires that 
prospective applicants align their legal codes and foreign and economic policies with the other 
members of the organization, in order to ensure that the transition to membership goes as smoothly as 
possible (12). With the fall of the Klaus government in 1997, the Czech Republic begins to rededicate 
itself to full integration with NATO and the EU (16). Despite reservations over NATO's 1999 bombing 
campaign in Serbia, which many in the Czech Republic considered to be somewhat of a historical 
friend, the Czech government indicates its support for the mission (16). The Czechs quickly reaffirmed 
their commitment to the organization and have since participated, through the supplying of troops, in 
peace-keeping missions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and in the international effort in Afghanistan 
(17).In May 2004, the Czech Republic formally becomes a member of the European Union (21). 
Since joining the EU, Baun argues that the Czech Republic has not settled for a passive role 
within the organization. Rather, Czech leaders have attempted to actively shape the organization's 
foreign policy outlook. In particular, the Czechs have pushed for further expansion into south-eastern 
Europe (22). They have also displayed a degree of support for membership for Turkey and for the 
development of closer with the former Soviet republics located on the Union's eastern border (22). 
Having been dominated for decades by Moscow, the Czech Republic maintains a critical view of 
Russia's foreign policy towards its neighbors (23). In a continuation of Vaclav Havel's attitude 
immediately following the fall of the communist regime, the Czech Republic has established itself as a 
leading advocate for human rights. In a shift, however, the Czechs are capable of using the EU as a 
more powerful tool for the pursuit of humanitarian goals. 
ALLIANCE ANALYSIS
The continual Czech desire for security pacts is rooted not only in the historical experience of 
23
post-war Czechoslovakia, but in the subjugation of the Czechs to foreign rule for the past five 
centuries. The Czechs have historically endured long periods of occupation, with only intermittent 
periods of true independence. In 1526, following a period of roughly 300 years during which the Czech 
lands represented the main section of one of the most powerful empires in Europe, the territories of 
Bohemia and Moravia become part of the Habsburg empire (Vesely 681). Later, in 1620, a Czech 
uprising is defeated at the Battle of White Mountain. International relations professor Zdenek Vesely 
argues that the Czechs may have been better prepared to face the Habsburgs had they received foreign 
support, but were left to revolt alone and were ultimately defeated (681). Through the defeat, the 
Habsburgs are able to strip the Czechs of their independence and move to incorporate the Czech lands 
into the Habsburg empire (681). Thus, the Czech lands, which at their height had been one of the major 
powers in Europe by this point are completely subservient to the Habsburg Empire. In 1867, the Czech 
lands fall under Hungarian control as the Habsburg Empire becomes the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(682). The First World War, which leads to the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, represents 
the ideal opportunity for the Czechs, along with the Slovaks, to regain their independence after 
centuries of control from Vienna. Successfully persuading the great powers in the justness of its cause, 
the Czechoslovak state is one of the states formed out of the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 
1918 (682).
Headed by Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, the Czechs move to establish partnerships which will 
help them to preserve their long-sought independence. Lacking guarantees for its security from 
irredentist neighbors such as Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovak leaders seek out alliances with 
neighbors facing similar threats. France represents a geographically ideal partner for Czechoslovakia. 
With both states bordering Germany, renewed aggression from Berlin would force Paris and Prague to 
consider a military response. Thus, an alliance between the Czechs and French seems to represent a 
promising method for ensuring that said aggression does not emerge. Czechoslovakia's status as a 
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Slavic state provides a motive and opportunity for a further alliance with the Soviet Union. In an effort 
to create further stability, Czechoslovakia allies itself with Yugoslavia and Romania, who fear 
Hungarian irredentism. Thus, the partnership for collective security within central Europe. Partnerships 
developed during the 1920s and 1930s seem to confirm the realist idea that partnerships are formed 
when leaders develop an interest in tackling a specific issue. Czechoslovak diplomatic efforts made 
during this period are directed at dealing with threats from neighboring states. They thus seek out states 
with similar interests and attempt to establish alliances which will maximize their power.
Ultimately, however, the alliance's lack of a formal structure allows for it to be relatively easily 
abandoned. Indeed, the lack of formality allows for all of Czechoslovakia's partners of the period to 
defect when desired. Jervis argues that realists support the creation of alliances in the event that they 
are binding (Jervis 56). There must be great costs for defection and great incentive for maintenance 
within a partnership. The lack of formal structure of Czechoslovakia's partnerships of this time 
provided little cost for defection. The French and Soviets are willing to sacrifice the Czechs at Munich 
in 1938 in an attempt to save themselves, but all three sides ultimately suffer the same fate. The French, 
once alliles of the Czechs, push for the Czechs to accept German demands because they  believe that 
they might save themselves (Wallace 208). One might argue that, had the states demonstrated a true 
commitment to the partnership and attempted to increase the cost of defection, their fates may have 
ultimately been avoided. Thus, the failure of Czechoslovakia to protect itself from foreign invasion at 
this time indicates that its efforts were ultimately unsuccessful and a reflection of lingering uncertainty 
between the states of Europe at this time. 
Czechoslovakia falls under the control of Moscow as the price for victory in the Second World 
War. With the rise to power of the communists, Czechoslovakia orients its foreign policy away from the 
Western powers and towards the Soviet Union, partly as a result of the betrayal at Munich. As a result 
of its Moscow-influenced foreign policy, Czechoslovakia becomes a party to the Warsaw Pact, which, 
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excluding Yugoslavia, unifies within an alliance the communist states of central and eastern Europe 
(346). Ostensibly a joint agreement, the alliance represents a Moscow-controlled counterweight to the 
Western Power-created defensive zone of NATO. Thus, Czechoslovakia enters into its first formal 
alliance. 
The alliance does not ultimately protect the Czech state from invasion, however. In August 
1968, the armies of the Warsaw Pact members occupy Czechoslovakia (Wallace 337). Prague is 
helpless to prevent the occupation. The occupation, which will set the stage for future Czech foreign 
policy, indicates that the Warsaw Pact does not represent an ideal international organization. While the 
alliance acts a counter-alliance to NATO and a measure through which inter-state peace may be 
preserved, it does lend itself to international cooperation. Liberals would argue that the organization 
demonstrated little potential for the promotion of international cooperation as all members of the 
alliance maintained autocratic governments. Realists, on the other hand, would argue that international 
organizations offer little aid in the promotion of international cooperation as they do not represent 
autonomous bodies, but extensions of the states which control them. In this instance, the Warsaw Pact 
does not act autonomously, but goes as Moscow instructs (Mastny 149).
With the Velvet Revolution and fall of the communist regime in 1989, the Czechs receive the 
opportunity to once again chart an independent foreign policy course. For some, such as President 
Vaclav Havel, the state's optimal situation would lie in the creation of a new, pan-European security 
organization. Even after Czech leaders abandon the idea of a pan-European security organization which 
would replace NATO, they indicate a desire to join both NATO and the EU. Having become truly 
independent and without immediately hostile neighbors for the first time, Czech leaders again search 
for ways in which state security may be made permanent. 
Not all are in favor of accession to NATO and the EU, however. Czechoslovakia as a young, 
independent state was, despite its diplomatic efforts, invaded by both enemies and allies alike. Entering 
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into partnerships with other states did not ensure the state's security. Despite strong interest from Vaclav 
Klaus' party in NATO accession, the public as a whole demonstrates skepticism about the idea of 
joining a new military alliance in the period immediately before the Czechs are invited to join (Baun 
11). Regardless, within a decade after the withdrawal of the forces of the Warsaw Pact states, the Czech 
Republic finds itself in a new military alliance. In its experience with NATO, the Czech Republic has 
experienced a sense of security unknown in its recent history. 
Participation in the European Union represents a different question altogether. In order to 
become a member of the EU, a state must demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice part of its sovereignty. 
Such demands, such as opening borders, agreeing to accept the authority of European lawmakers and 
courts, and being willing to economically integrate, represent the price states must be willing to pay for 
peace, stability, and economic security from larger economic actors. The organization's power and 
influence have allowed it to attract interested prospective members throughout its history. But, through 
its demands, the EU requires members to demonstrate a willingness to cede a measure of control over 
their domestic and foreign policies. Acceptance of the  acquis commauntaire, which includes all of the 
organization's laws, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains a pre-
condition for acceptance for any new member. Such an acceptance helps to ensure a smooth transition 
into the EU and to preserve the organization's effectiveness (Grabbe 250). Having only recently earned 
the right to determine its own policies, domestic and foreign, one understands Czech reluctance to so 
quickly again cede sovereignty to a larger power. However, the EU ultimately succeeds in attracting the 
Czechs to apply for membership in the period following the fall of the communist regime. Despite its 
reservations about ceding away part of its sovereignty, the Czech Republic decides that EU 
membership represents a better alternative than neutrality and agrees to accede. Following Jervis' 
argument that international organizations may become “deep self-binding,” the Czechs begin to accept 
the EU as a supranational governing body and develop policies with the EU in mind. Said effect 
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appears to work to establish a greater measure of cooperation within the organization. As members are 
required to abide by EU laws, the Czechs, and other members, will begin to develop laws and policies 
which will meet the standards of the larger body. They will not maintain all of the same laws as other 
member states, of course, but the “deep self-binding” effect pushes states to change their preferences so 
that they desire greater cooperation with others within the group. 
President Klaus has demonstrated a desire for the EU to work as a medium for inter-
governmental discussion and cooperation, as to opposed to being a controlling, supranational body, but 
his criticisms have largely fallen on deaf ears. Indeed, following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Czech Republic, through Klaus, represented one of the final EU members to ratify the agreement 
(Telegraph). The treaty, which worked to further coordinate the policies of the organization's member-
states, ultimately went into effect as Klaus buckled under pressure from the other states. Regardless of 
reservations which he may have maintained about ceding away further Czech sovereignty, he was 
unwilling to derail the efforts of all the other states to establish a greater degree of cooperation due to 
his own wishes. 
Further, through the rotating presidency, each of the organization's members maintains the right 
to direct the organization's interests as they see fit. Thus, while the Czechs may maintain concerns 
about the effects of ceding away a degree of sovereignty, the rotating presidency assures them that they 
will have the opportunity to outline the organization's priorities, as opposed to being continually 
dominated by the larger powers with the group. The Czech presidency, while not a a huge success, 
provides the Czechs with the opportunity to push their “pet projects.” Overall, the Czechs experience 
mixed success during their time as with the EU presidency. They manage to move Belarus and the 
western Balkan states back to the forefront of EU priorities and they successfully secured funding for 
the Nabucco gas pipeline, which bypasses Russis on its way to Europe (Baun 26). The collapse of the 
Czech government in April proves to be a major source of embarrassment, however, and works to 
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disrupt the state's plans for the end of its time in the EU presidency (26). Nevertheless, the EU 
presidency offers states such as the Czech Republic to enjoy a far larger role on the international stage 
than they would otherwise. The Czech Republic maintains a small economy and little influence on the 
world stage, but the EU presidency offers it the opportunity to become, for six months, a far larger 
actor (24). 
29
4. SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ORIGIN OF SOVIET UNION
     Following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Russian Empire finds itself diplomatically 
isolated (Bovykin 22). As a result, Tsar Alexander III enters into the Three Emperors' Alliance with the 
leaders of Germany and Austro-Hungary, despite misgivings about their attitude towards Russian 
foreign policy (22). Unwilling to allow the possibility of a combined German-Austrian threat to 
Russian interests in the Balkans, the tsar perceives an alliance as means through which the Germans 
and Austro-Hungarians may be tied down. Through the alliance, each state receives a promise that the 
others will remain neutral in the event of a war involving one of the members (Conybeare 1198). By 
1887, however, the Three Emperors' Treaty no longer represents a guarantor of the protection of 
Russian interests, particularly against Austro-Hungarian hostility in the Balkans (Bovykin 22). For the 
French, an alliance with Russia now exists as a real possibility and, following Tsar Alexander's 
advising of Bismarck, the German leader, against a war with France, the French approach about an 
alliance (22). France fails in its initial approach about a partnership, but increasing tension in relations 
with Germany in 1887 soon leads to a recalculation in the foreign policy outlook of the Russian state 
(23). 
Following a change in government in Germany in 1890, the Russian Empire finds itself in need 
of a new source of financial support for its economy (Collins 777). Despite Russian interest in 
renewing the Russo-German Treaty of 1887, the new government in Berlin decides that it will direct its 
diplomatic efforts elsewhere (Bovykin 24). France, already financially supporting the Russian state and 
again in need of a military ally against Germany, represents an ideal partner for the Russians at this 
time (26). In 1892, France and Russia sign a military convention which provides that, in the event of an 
attack upon either state by Germany, the other will declare war and enter the conflict (27). While the 
Russians seek a partnership with the French for primarily financial reasons, they are willing to offer the 
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political and military support necessary in order to be reached (Collins 777). Following the Russo-
Japanese War, relations between the Russians and French deteriorate, as the Russians by 1911 begin to 
declare that, in the event of a Franco-German war, they are essentially willing to offer France 
diplomatic support alone (30). German-Russian conflict over the Black Sea Straits soon inspires a 
renewal of the partnership between France and Russia, as well as the British, who by now emerge as an 
ally on the side of the French, as neither state wishes to face Germany alone in the event of war (32). 
Sensing a war on the horizon, particularly with the German Schlieffen Plan, which outlines plans for a 
war with both France and Russia, the French and Russians in 1913 begin to prepare for a conflict with 
Germany (32). 
By January 1914, however, the French and British begin to recognize that the uprising by 
revolutionary elements in the Russian Empire threatens to weaken the alliance to the point that, in the 
event of war, they will be forced to face the Germans alone (33). The French and British are concerned, 
in particular, that the Russians, in order to avoid a conflict which may lead to the collapse of the 
empire, will demonstrate a willingness to make concessions to the Germans in exchange for peace (33). 
On August 1st, 1914, following Russian mobilization in preparation for war, Germany declares war on 
the Russian Empire (34). Within three days, the French and British are drawn into the conflict, as well 
(34). Russian thus begins to fulfill its obligations by attacking the Germans in East Prussia and the 
Austrian-Hungarians in Galicia (35). 
The Russian Empire enters the First World War in order to uphold its obligation to support the 
French in a war against Germany. While Tsar Alexander III enters into an alliance with the French in 
1892 largely for economic reasons, it ultimately must honor its promise to support France in its 
struggle for security from the German threat, even as uprisings at home threaten the tsardom itself. 
Ultimately, the war assists in realizing the fears of the French and British as, on March 2nd, 1917, the 
Tsar Nikolai II abdicates the throne (Yarov 21). 
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The day of the abdication the Provisional Government, headed by moderate-liberal Prince G.E. 
Lvov, begins its reign and, six days later, the United States becomes the first of the great military 
powers to recognize the new Provisional Government as the legitimate authority within the Russian 
state (33).The recognition of the government merely represented a formality. The Allies, still fighting 
the  war, remain primarily interested in whether or not the new government would continue to uphold 
its commitment and see the war to its end (33). From the Provisional Government the allies receive 
assurances that nothing will change and that the Russian state will remain in the struggle, but by the 
summer of 1917, however, the Russians begins to waver in their commitment to the war effort (33). On 
July 6th, the Provisional Government declares that it desires a conference of the allies, through which 
the general direction of their foreign policies will be defined (37). The allies agree to a peace 
conference in Paris in 1917, but instead of the proposed discussion of the goals of the war, the 
conference would focus upon the means through which war may be continued and upon the question of 
military help for Russia (38). 
In December 1917, the Bolsheviks, having taken power from the Provisional Government 
during the “October Revolution,” issue a “Declaration of Peace,” which they believe will quickly bring 
the war to a conclusion (61). Germany and the Allies alike subsequently reject the declaration (61). 
Having failed to convince the allies of the necessity of a conclusion to the war, Russia decides that it 
will approach the Germans alone about the idea of a peace agreement (77). The Germans agree to talk, 
but only according to their terms, which include cessation control over the Polish, Belorussian, 
Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian territories and peoples (78). On March 3rd 1918, without discussion 
of the conditions, Russia agrees to Germany's terms and signs the Brest-Litovsky Agreement. Thus 
ends active Russian participation in the First World War (80). In December 1922, following the Russian 
Civil War, in which the pro-tsar White Army falls to the Bolshevik Red Army, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics is declared (116). 
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Following the establishment of the USSR, the Soviets find themselves largely isolated in the 
international arena (80). In both failing to pay back loans from the tsarist and Provisional Government 
periods and calling for the overthrow of foreign governments, the new Soviet government finds few 
friends among the world's Great Powers (81). In 1924, only after it agrees to limit its propaganda 
efforts and attempts to push for the overthrow of foreign governments, does the Soviet Union emerge 
from isolation as it receives recognition from England, France, and Italy (130). Despite its desire for 
friendly communist governments among the Great Powers of the world, the Soviet Union recognizes 
that the need for international relationships supersedes national preferences. 
SOVIET-GERMAN ALLIANCE
Historian Sergei Yarov writes that, “The main efforts of Soviet diplomacy in the 1930s were 
directed towards the elimination of the German threat in Europe” (134). Hitler's rise in Germany gave 
cause for consternation in the Soviet Union as he did not make a secret of the reality that his 
rearmament efforts carried an anti-Bolshevik purpose (134). The Soviet Union, in response to Nazi 
aggression towards Czechoslovakia in 1938, offers Prague military aid. But, as France selects 
appeasement over the threat of another costly war, the Franco-Soviet alliance fails to prevent the Nazi 
conquest of the Czech lands (134). 
Despite Soviet efforts to establish collective security in the 1930s, alliances formed fail to 
prevent Nazi aggression, against Czechoslovakia in particular. In Yarov's view, distrust of the Soviet 
Union from the West greatly contributes to the failure to maintain peace and stability on the continent 
(135). The Soviet Union, as the leading communist state of the time, viewed itself as a leader in the 
worldwide workers' revolution. Thus, deterred by Moscow's anti-imperalist propaganda, the West 
demonstrates little desire to cooperate with Stalin and the Soviet Union. Believing that the USSR 
sought to advance only its own interests, the major powers of the West preferred to deal directly with 
the Nazis (135). Only after Germany occupies Czechoslovakia do France and England offer military 
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help to Poland and Romania, who they considered potential victims of Hitler's aggression (135). 
According to scholar Dzhangir Nadzhafov, senior scholar at the Institute of General History at the 
Russian Academy of Science, the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was 
concluded while military-diplomatic negotiations continued with France and England (Nadzhafov 4). 
Soviet leaders thus declared to English and French representatives that further negotiations would be 
meaningless and they that would leave the Soviet capital without any sort of agreement in hand (5). 
The Soviet Union, acting with a degree of leverage, negotiates at this time with both sides in order to 
maximize the deal it will receive (5). With the Nazis, French, and British all seeking a certain outcome 
from the Soviet Union, Moscow can afford to select the best available option. Indeed, as tensions rise 
in Europe, the Soviet Union's decision becomes ever more important (5). While the Soviet Union 
briefly in the 1930s demonstrated a desire for the establishment of collective security, anti-West 
propaganda again reemerges following the signing of the pact with Nazi Germany (5). In Stalin's view, 
the pact would prove useful in that it would shield the Soviet Union from the imperialist states of the 
West (6). 
Nadzhafov argues that communist leaders in the Soviet Union, from the state's earliest days in 
1918, desired good relations with Germany (7). An alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union 
would act as a strong counterweight to the victorious, imperialist states of the West (7). Furthermore, as 
one of the defeated in the First World War, Germany's status suggests that it holds the potential to be a 
powerful communist state in central Europe. Nadzhafov states that, “Academic E.L. Feinberg recalls 
holiday demonstrations in Moscow in the 1920s with the slogan  'The Russian sickle and German 
hammer will unite the entire world' written on banners” (7). Thus, an alliance between the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany seems to represent a perfect fit. The Soviet Union wished to maintain peace and to 
disrupt the intentions of the imperialistic West and Nazi Germany wished to keep the Soviet Union out 
of the impending war as it focused its intentions upon France and England. 
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which served as a non-aggression agreement between 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, represents one of the most important inter-state agreements 
reached during the period leading to the Second World War. Through the pact, Germany and the Soviet 
Union define spheres of influence for themselves. The Soviet Union receives Finland, the Baltic States 
of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories which had previously 
been controlled by Poland (Yarov 137). With the German invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6th, 1941, 
however, relations between the Berlin and Moscow fall apart. The Soviet Union had on the previous 
day signed a pact of non-aggression with Yugoslavia and decides that it can no longer work with Nazi 
Germany (138). The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Nazis and the Soviets allows Moscow to 
begin to rearm the Red Army and prepare for a future military conflict (137). Said military conflict 
soon arrives as on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany declares war on the Soviet Union (139).
ALLIES OF SECOND WORLD WAR
In order to combat Hitler's aggression, the Soviet Union must turn to its primary ideological 
enemies, the United States and the England for assistance. During the period leading to the entry of the 
Soviet Union into the Second World War, relations with the West were hostile, according to Yarov 
(215). After the war begins, however, the situation begins to change. Despite hostile views maintained 
in the pre-war period, the West and Soviet Union begin to understand that they must rely on one 
another for assistance. Yarov writes that by June 22nd 1941, less than two years following the signing of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivers a radio addressing in 
support of the Soviet Union (215). In order to win the Allies' full support, however, the Soviet Union 
must make a firm commitment to the alliance by signing the Atlantic Charter, which condemned the 
violent alteration of national borders and established the right self-determination for all nations 
(Nadzhafov 12). Despite having already violated these principles in regard to the populations of the 
modern-day Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, and Finland, the Soviet Union agrees to the Charter and 
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formally enters into an alliance with its ideological enemies of the West (12). 
When British Minister of Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden comes to Moscow to discuss the 
alliance, Stalin declares to him that he remains more concerned with the post-war borders of the Soviet 
Union than with any agreement signed with the West (12). In doing so, the Soviet leader establishes 
that, while a formal agreement to adhere to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of 
Europe, the Soviet Union does not intend to release from its grasp the Baltic territories and Finland, 
acquired following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. The British, in 
order to appeal to the Soviets and to avoid a repeat of the failed negotiation efforts of the previous 
decade, attempt to avoid issues other than economic and military cooperation (Yarov 215). The Soviets, 
however, continue to insist upon recognition of territorial gains made during 1939 and 1940 (216). 
Upon receiving a rejection from the British, the two sides sign an agreement declaring that any 
negotiations or peace agreements with the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan will be conducted 
only with the participation of both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (216). The Soviets further 
attempt to pressure the British into recognizing the territorial gains made by the Soviet Union on its 
western border in December 1941 and May 1942, but fail in both attempts (216). The two sides sign a 
further agreement of cooperation in May 1942, but the border question remains unresolved (216). 
The United States, in contrast to the British, does not enter into negotiations with the Soviet 
Union about an alliance, as it has not become an active participant in the conflict (216). While the 
British seek Soviet assistance out of necessity, the United States prefers to watch the conflct from afar. 
While relations between the two powers improve, the US does not offer the Soviets military assistance 
when a representative of the president, Harry Hopkins, visits the Soviet Union in July 1941 (216). 
Yarov writes that only after the United States begins in the lend-lease program in November 1941 does 
the Soviet Union receive military supplies (216). 
The Soviet Union, for its part, recognizes that opening of a second front, by the British, to the 
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south or west of Germany, in France or Italy, represents the best option for defeating the Germans and 
bringing the war to a conclusion. The Soviets insist upon the opening of a second front as early as the 
first negotiations with the British in the summer of 1941 (217). The British and the Americans, who by 
this point have entered the conflict in Europe as an active participant, open a second front in northern 
Africa in 1942 (217). Stalin remains unsatisfied, however, as believes the opening of a second front 
directly on the European continent represents the best means to victory (217). Only at the Tehran 
Conference in late November 1943 are the Soviets able to pressure their Western allies into opening a 
second front in France (217). 
As the war draws to a close, the Allies meet at Yalta, in Ukraine, to discuss the future of post-
war Europe. While military efforts have almost completely eliminated the Axis threat, the victors again, 
as following the First World War, meet to determine the status of the continent's states. Having failed 
after the First World War to establish a permanent peace, the Allies are tasked with mapping out an 
alternative plan for stability. As a result of the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, the Allies divide 
Germany among themselves to ensure stability, allow for Poland to become a satellite of the Soviet 
Union, peace agreements are signed with all of the former allies of the European Axis powers, and the 
powers agree to relinquish territory acquired during the war (218-219, 222).
WARSAW PACT
The Warsaw Pact represented the main tool through which the Soviet Union controlled the 
activities of its central and eastern European allies during the Cold War. Otto Pick, professor of 
international relations as the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom, argues that the Warsaw Pact 
was established in 1955 following the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany, more commonly 
known as West Germany, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Warsaw Pact's founding 
members included the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Albania (Pick). Vojtech Mastny argues that the Warsaw Pact was largely a redundant bloc, as the Soviet 
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Union had already signed treaties of “friendship and mutual assistance” with each of the countries 
involved (Mastny 142). Mastny argues that Soviet motives behind the establishment of the Warsaw 
Pact were not military, but political in nature. NATO, having been established 6 years earlier, was not 
viewed as posing an immediate threat to the Soviet Union or to any of the parties to the newly-formed 
alliance (142). Khruschev, desiring the collapse of NATO, promotes the creation of the Warsaw Pact as 
a means through which said collapse might be achieved. In agreeing for disbanding his newly-formed 
alliance, he believed that the Western states would be willing to agree to the dissolution of NATO 
(143). Indeed, documents from the Soviet foreign ministry indicate that, once NATO had been 
dismantled, the Soviet Union would take charge of a new, pan-European military apparatus (143). 
Mastny argues that the rearmament of the German Democratic Republic, known more commonly as 
East German, represented on of the organization's only true early achievements. While the West and 
NATO had been willing to allow for rearmament of West Germany, the Soviet Union had been 
reluctant to follow suit on its part with East Germany. Through the Warsaw Pact, East Germany was 
allowed to restore some of its former military capabilities (144). Otherwise, the Warsaw Pact in its 
earliest years existed largely for show to the West. Indeed, when the Soviet Union acts to suppress the 
uprising in Hungary in 1956, it acts not through the Warsaw Pact, but through the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON). Such a move seems to betray Khruschev's lack of confidence in 
his own creation. 
Despite its purpose as a body through which military policy might be coordinated, the Warsaw 
Pact has the negative effect of dragging states into conflicts in which they may not otherwise have 
become involved. When Khruschev decides to erect the Berlin Wall in 1961, he declares that the 
project represents a collective effort by the parties to the Warsaw Pact (146). The other members, 
though, having little connection with East Germany, demonstrate unease over the ideas that they made 
become military targets out of retribution for move (146). The alliance thus creates the negative effect 
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of offering the communist states of central and eastern Europe a mechanism through which they can 
ally to oppose foreign policy efforts. Once the alliance enters into force and states become acquainted 
with its structure, they are use the negotiating table to push for particular foreign policy outcomes. 
Throughout its history, the Warsaw Pact fails to coordinate the foreign policies of its member-
states. While the Soviet Union often acts as a major power interested in proving itself as the leading 
communist state, the other members of the bloc often appear to have greater interest in domestic reform 
or national security. Polish and Hungarian efforts to leave the alliance in 1956, as well the expulsion of 
Albania highlight the bloc's weakness. While one would imagine a Soviet Union firmly in control over 
the bloc's activities, the members in reality remained deeply divided with regards to their foreign 
policies. 
In time, however, the Warsaw Pact, under Brezhnev's leadership, begins to transform into a 
more powerful and unified military bloc. With the establishment of a military council, a committee on 
technology, and a committee of defense ministers, the Warsaw Pact in the early 1970s begins to finally 
appear as NATO's counterpart (150). Moscow, while often in disagreement with the other members of 
the bloc on many pressing issues, nevertheless to draw out from the members a position of solidarity. 
Even in Moscow's 1970s plans for a large-scale offensive war against western Europe receives the tacit 
approval of the other members of the bloc (151). Over time, though, the Warsaw Pact loses cohesion as 
the Soviet Union must increasingly rely upon its subordinates to act, as the Poles do in declaring 
martial law during the 1980s (153). By June 1991, the Warsaw Pact had outlived its usefulness and the 
organization's members agree to dissolve it (155).
ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The fall of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent establishment of the Russian Federation, 
represents one of the most significant and widely-felt political developments of the 20th century. 
Bringing to a close an era of authoritarian, communist rule in the eastern part of Europe, the Soviet 
39
Union's fall allows for discussion to begin regarding the potential for a unified, cooperative European 
continent. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union following the death of the Konstantin Chernenko (Pikhoya 128). Despite rumors of a 
power struggle in the period leading to his selection, Gorbachev enjoys a large amount of support from 
those hoping for a younger, more driven leader (126). As the people of the Soviet Union demand 
improvements to the state's management of the economy and a leader capable of understanding the 
needs of the people and making the necessary changes, Gorbachev emerges as an obvious choice to 
become the next General Secretary (127). In an effort to improve the efficiency of the state, Gorbachev 
introduces a policy of “glasnost,” which allows for criticism of the system, which aids in the search for 
“true socialism” (177). In allowing for criticism, Gorbachev opens the system itself to criticism (179). 
By 1991, the allowance of criticism of the communist system spurs the desire for its removal and in 
December, the Soviet Union ceases to exist (409). On December 25th, 1991, the flag of the Russian 
Federation replaces the Soviet flag over the Kremlin in Moscow and a new page in the political history 
of Russia opens (412). 
EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
With the end of the communist period in central and eastern Europe and the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian Federation emerges as a newly independent state. With the Warsaw Pact 
disbanding, NATO remains as the primary military bloc on the European continent. Russia, free from 
the shackles of its economic and political ideology, may approach the West as more of a partner than at 
any point since 1917. Indeed, the NATO-Russia Council, established in 2002, represents one effort to 
build relations between the two former enemies (NRC).
 In 2001, Russia first declares its desire for a strategic partnership with the European Union. In a 
speech delivered at the Bundestag in Berlin, Vladimir Putin, then the Russian president, outlines a plan 
for greater cooperation on economic matters, external security, scientific research, and education 
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(Matsepuro 99). In 2005 in Moscow, Russia and the EU sign “Road Maps” providing for greater 
cooperation in each of the spheres. 
However, the “maps” are not greeted with universal approval on either side. Despite the 
indication of a turning point for the better in EU-Russia relations, the Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sergei Lavrov states that “residues of the old approaches [by the West] remain” (99). Rather 
than push for greater cooperation, the two sides appear content to remain in a sort of holding pattern. 
While the era of communist, authoritarian states has come to an end in Europe, a sense of distrust 
remains. 
As the European Union was created to handle a very specific challenge, the “road maps” for 
future development in relations between the EU and Russia are limited in nature. However, with a 
commitment from both sides and the passage of time from the end of the Cold War, the potential exists 
for increased cooperation. In efforts to build relations, both sides must be willing to demonstrate a 
degree of humility over the past. The formerly communist states of central and eastern integrate into 
the European Union relatively quickly following the end of the Cold War as they had only been 
unwilling participants in the ideological conflict between the Great Powers of the West and Soviet 
Union. 
ALLIANCE ANALYSIS
The Soviet Union, like Czechoslovakia, used alliances in order to secure its territory from 
foreign threats. The Soviet pact with Nazi Germany represented an attempt by Moscow to remove 
threats to the Russian borders from the west. The Soviet-German pact supports realist thinking as it 
represents an alliance forged out of necessity. Fearful of what the Germans may do on their own, the 
Soviet Union attempts to reach out to them to stall their aggressive behavior. Jervis believes that such 
agreements ensure stability so long as the state under threat recognizes the intentions of the other (53). 
If the state acting as an aggressor wishes only to shore up its security, an agreement may be satisfactory 
41
to prevent a conflict. If the aggressive state wishes to dominate others, however, appeasement efforts 
will be rendered useless. In this instance, the Soviet Union does not understand the reality behind the 
intentions of the Nazis. Despite the signing of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets are unable to halt 
Nazi aggression through diplomatic means. Thus, they are forced to deal with the threat through 
military action and at great cost.
In an effort to better deal with the Nazi threat, the Soviet Union turns to the capitalist powers of 
Western Europe and the United States for assistance. Such an alliance seems to also support the realist 
view, as the ideological opponents ally with one another only out of expediency. Following the war, 
with the threat neutralized, the Soviet Union and the Western powers cease to cooperate with one 
another. In fact, the United States moves to establish with the states of western Europe the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which acts as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union and the 
future leaders of NATO are able to cooperate during the Second World War, but only out of the 
necessity to defeat Nazi aggression. Their interests ultimately do not align and they do not declare a 
willingness to cooperate in the post-war period. 
The Warsaw Pact arguably cannot be considered a genuine alliance, as the states fall heavily 
under Soviet influence and may be said to have been coerced into becoming parties to the agreement. 
The Soviet acts a more legitimate means of control over the states of central and eastern Europe in that 
all parties represented, in theory, have a say in the management of the alliance. Ultimately, however, 
the Soviet Union maintains control over the organization's direction in terms of foreign policy. Realists, 
argue that alliances are successful when they firmly bind members to one another. That is to say that, 
when the costs of defection are so high that members are unwilling to face them, the partnership will 
hold. In this instance, the partnership holds because states are unwilling to risk Soviet military 
aggression. When Czechoslovakia attempts domestic reforms in 1968, the Soviet Union, through the 
Warsaw Pact, responds with force and attempts to restore order to the region (Wallace 337). Thus, 
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while states may demonstrate an interest in defecting, the cost to national sovereignty, over which they 
already maintain only partial control, will be too great to risk. Therefore, the partnership holds. In 
1991, the Warsaw Pact disbands. Believing that the organization serves no further purpose, its members 
opt out. NATO, in contrast, not only survives the end of the communist period in central and eastern 
Europe, but expands to include former members of the Warsaw Pact, such as the Czech Republic (Baun 
16). Thus, those formerly authoritarian members of the Warsaw Pact did not believe that defensive 
alliances served no purpose, but that they should no longer ally themselves with the Soviet Union.
The Russian Federation, successor to the Soviet Union, elected not to integrate into Europe in 
the period following the end of the Cold War and, indeed, was not invited. Russia has attempted to 
build economic and military partnerships with its former adversaries, but has not demonstrated interest 
in becoming a member of either the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Prior to 
the First World War, Russia controlled a territory which included many of its newly-independent 
neighbors on all sides within the Russian Empire. Following the fall of the Russian Empire, the Soviet 
Union emerged on largely the same territory, Now, however, Russia controls only its own territories. 
The other former republics of the Soviet Union have become independent and have elected to select 
their own foreign policies. Russia does not abandon the idea that it maintains a right to influence its 
neighbors, however. Still considering itself a great power, it has taken steps to reassert itself in the 
international arena. The 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, during which Russia attempted to push 
into power the current Ukrainian Viktor Yanukovych, and the 2008 invasion of neighboring Georgia, 
through which Russia attempted to assert its military might, represent attempts at striking back over 
what it considers Western encroachment. 
Russia does not maintain a completely hostile view of the West, however. While Russia may 
continue to disapprove of the foreign policy decisions made by the United States, it recognizes that 
good business relations can be very profitable. As long as Russia relies upon Europe as a primary 
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consumer of its natural gas, it will attempt to build relations with whom good relations must be built. 
Germany, which remains very interested in the economic security of its country and the European 
Union, has emerged as a major partner with Russia in the natural gas trade. The Germans have in recent 
years constructed a pipeline connecting Russia and Germany in order to maintain the flow of natural 
gas throughout any disputes. Germany coolness towards the NATO intentions of Georgia and Ukraine 
indicates that it recognizes that Russia represents a more important potential partner. 
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5. EVALUATION OF ALLIANCE SYSTEM
EFFECTIVENESS
In order to evaluate alliances and international organizations, an effort must be taken to evaluate 
their effectiveness in achieving their state goals. Organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the UN, 
while different in scope and function, maintain the same basic goal of peace and cooperation. Using 
different methods, all three organizations have worked to promote peace and security, with varying 
degrees of success for their member-states. Thus, despite debates and criticism over their roles and 
methods, both formal alliances and international organizations have demonstrated a degree of 
effectiveness in work towards the promotion of peace and mutual prosperity.
In measuring the effectiveness of an organization, one must take into account the role which it 
defines for itself. As a defensive shield, NATO should be considered to be quite effective. The promise 
of a response from all members of the organization acts a strong deterrent against acts of war by non-
members. In this limited role, NATO can be considered to be a successful model for defensive 
alliances. The organization also succeeds in cooperation among members for the purpose of the 
development of the military capabilities of the member-states. Smaller states are able to receive through 
the organization military training, equipment, and expertise which they may not otherwise receive. 
They are offered a sense of security in knowing that, in the event of an attack by an non-NATO actor, 
they will be backed by the militaries of all of the members of the organization. Thus, they are able to 
operate more freely and effectively in relations with outside parties.
However, the level of effectiveness of the organization changes when one considers its role as 
an offensive alliance. In intervening in the affairs of states which do not directly threaten the alliance's 
members, creating consensus on taking action presents a challenge. Those pushing for action may be 
able to push reluctant members into becoming participants, but political capital must be spent. 
Politicians may be unwilling to support participation in humanitarian interventions as they risk losing 
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voter approval within their countries. Thus, attempts to move outside the organizations original purpose 
threaten to weaken the organization's original purpose and role as a strong defensive partnership. 
The lack of a unified foreign policy also works to hinder the organization's effectiveness. As a 
defensive shield, few questions arise. But as the alliance broadens its role and attempts to more actively 
coordinate its military actions, issue arise. Many of the histories of the individual member-states of the 
alliance, particularly of those located in Europe, threaten to lead to rifts within the alliance. States such 
as Germany, with its history of aggression towards its neighbors, and Poland and the Czech Republic, 
with histories of occupation by foreign powers, remain reluctant to actively participate in military 
conflicts abroad. While they agree to answer the organization's call in times of crisis, they are more 
committed to the organization's original purpose of collective security. 
Regional organizations, such as the EU, are arguably most successful when they establish 
stringent conditions for accession. Rather than maintain an open admittance policy, they require 
prospective members to demonstrate a high degree of respect for domestic freedom and democracy and 
to demonstrate a level of fiscal responsibility. Once admitted, members are expected to remain 
committed to the values and standards of the organization. Thus, by establishing pre-conditions for 
accession, the organization ensures that, once states become members, conflicts will be easier to 
control. By dangling the possibility of membership in front of interested prospective members, the EU 
thus manages to encourage true democracy and fiscal responsibility. Those unlikely to receive 
admittance are, however, less likely to pursue a course of reform and fiscal responsibility. 
By requiring a level of discipline as a condition, the EU thus establishes itself as a model for 
successful regional organization. Once admitted, members of other regional blocs have less incentive to 
reform and become fiscally responsible states. Reform from within the organization proves to be more 
difficult than reform from without. Once states have entered the alliance, they will be able to more 
effectively resist pressure to reform from other members. Further, once in the organization, members 
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are unlikely to be expelled, particularly if the other members have demonstrated a similar reluctance to 
pursue a course of reform. 
The attractiveness of EU membership to interested prospective non-members offers another 
indication of the effectiveness of the EU. Rather than contract or lose support from members, the EU 
currently maintains around its borders a host of interested prospective members. Turkey, Iceland, the 
states of the former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Georgia have all demonstrated, to one degree or another, 
in recent years an interest in becoming full members of the organization. Thus, the very fact that 
neighboring non-members have pushed for acceptance indicates that the benefits the organization 
provides remain attractive. 
Even more basically, the organization has achieved its initial goal of peace through economic 
integration. While the possibility remains that members may engage in military conflicts among one 
another, the disincentives are so great that such possibilities are minimized almost to the point of non-
existence. Through the promotion of democracy, deep economic integration, and the establishment of 
institutions through which conflicts can be discussed and resolved, the EU ensures, as effectively as 
one might reasonably expect that any tensions will not expand into open hostilities. Liberal 
international relations theorists argues that democracy and economic integration are effective measures 
for the management of conflicts and the prevention of open hostilities. In this, the EU has established 
itself as a model of success. 
The same cannot be said for organizations with broader scopes. While the United Nations, a 
international governmental organization, remains a strong concept for the promotion of inter-state 
cooperation, it cannot maintain the same level of effectiveness as does the EU. A more open admission 
policy allows states to enjoy international recognition without first having to commit themselves to a 
course of reform and establish true democracy.
Despite its flaws and relatively open admissions policy, the United Nations should not be 
47
considered a complete failure. When hostilities emerge between member-states, the UN represents a 
more legitimate medium through which mediators may become involved. Were Western states to take 
direct action in the resolution of conflicts, their actions may be construed as imperialistic and 
aggressive. Action through the UN, however, offers a greater sense of legitimacy. The degree to which 
states may become involved remains under debate, but the UN allows those wishing to intervene to 
appear more as disinterested parties. 
The UN may also be considered effective in that it has established itself as a more permanent 
organization than its predecessor, the League of Nations. It has expanded from its founding to include 
nearly all of the planet's nation-states. However, the organization's low profile may be a contributing 
factor to its continued existence. While organizations such as the EU work to deepen and become more 
thoroughly involved in the domestic politics of its member-states, the UN largely remains unnoticed by 
the world's politicians and media. The organization does not appear to create for itself a stronger and 
more prominent role on the international arena. When states interested in defusing crises seek political 
legitimacy, they turn to the UN for cover for their actions. Usually, however, the organization remains 
largely invisible to many people.
The UN's broad scope may also contribute to its limited effectiveness. While the EU requires 
prospective members to demonstrate a commitment to the organization's values and ideals, the UN's 
relatively open admission policy allows for greater conflict between members. Thus, the difficulty in 
achieving widespread consensus on controversial issues hampers the UN's ability to act effectively. 
Thus, the question of legitimacy remains. Including a far greater number of states, actions taken by the 
UN would be considered more legitimate on the international stage. However, the organizations role as 
a disinterested actor and the difficulty in making real progress in conflict resolution.
CRITICISMS
Alliances and international organizations offer states a venue through which conflicts may be 
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mitigated, but neither represents a perfect solution to international hostilities. Alliances have flaws in 
that, not only do they ultimately fail to meet direct threats and achieve their purpose of collective 
security, but they also may lead to the creation of counter-alliances, as fear and distrust spurs non-
members to form similar partnerships for collective security. Thus, while alliances are created in an 
effort to provide a sense of security to participants, they may have the effect of increasing tensions 
when counter-alliances are formed. Such tensions do not necessarily lead to direct military conflict, but 
a rise in tensions between states would hardly be considered productive for the promotion of peace and 
mutual prosperity within the international community. Even formal alliances encounter difficulties, 
such as in the question of expansion. While states such as Ukraine and Georgia have previously 
indicated a desire to become members of NATO, their statuses remain in question, as the organization 
remains reluctant to provoke possible retribution from Russia, which, during the Soviet period, guided 
the foreign policies of and currently maintains a border with both states. Among NATO members, there 
exists a division in opinion over possible eastward expansion. While European members of the 
organization rely upon Russia for natural gas shipments, the United States remains more economically 
independent. France and Germany, choosing to maintain good relations with Russia largely at the 
expense of good relations with Ukraine, have chosen to push for the status quo (Erlanger). Berlin, in 
particular, through the creation of the NordStream pipeline, a natural gas pipeline linking Germany and 
Russia, demonstrates a willingness to allow Russia a free hand in relations with its neighbors as a price 
to pay for the continued economic security of Russia (Dempsey). The United States, in contrast, has in 
recent years developed a strong interest in the inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia within the defensive 
shield of NATO (Erlanger). The United States, unlike Germany and France, believes that it may more 
freely attempt to promote the interests of both Ukraine and Georgia. Thus, while alliances may offer 
collective security, they do not necessarily prevent the emergence of internal arguments. In particular, 
members, for various reasons, may maintain differing views on how best to deal with external actors. 
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Formal alliances, such as NATO, also encounter difficulty as they attempt to confront shifts in 
the balance of the international arena. Collective security represents a resonable option which one or 
more members may come under threat from an external state actor. However, the concept may fall 
apart when the threat in question comes from a transnational actor, such as a terrorist organization. 
While states maintain boundaries which are largely static and governments which represent their people 
in the international arena, terrorist organizations are more difficult to define. They may have visible 
leaders, but without defined national borders, they may move their centers of operations from 
safehaven to safehaven. Thus, the elimination of a threat represents a newer and more difficult 
challenge than elimination of a threat from a state. States which threaten others in the international 
arena may be considered more reasonable with which to deal as they are known and defined entities. 
Further, alliances such as NATO struggle as they attempt to define their role in the post-Cold 
War era. NATO acts effectively as a mechanism for preventing attacks from hostile states. As members 
are obligated to aid any member-state under attack, the organization provides a solid deterrent. 
However, the situation changes when one considers NATO as an offensive organization. NATO, in 
particular has redefined its role as purely as a defensive organization to being an organization willing to 
aid in the prevention of major humanitarian crises, such as in Bosnia, Kuwait, and in Libya. However, 
such as role remains controversial, as the organization does intervene in all crises. Further, there are 
questions as to how far the organization may take the role. Remaining a purely defensive organization 
generates little criticism from observers. But in order to involve itself as an active participate in intra-
state or inter-state conflicts which do not directly involve one of the organizations member-states, the 
alliance's purpose must be more narrowly defined. 
Besides questions over the role of alliances, such as NATO, as offensive or defensive alliances, 
leaders of participating states must deal with the idea of a unified foreign policy outlook. In the 
question of membership for Ukraine and Georgia, states such as the United States and Germany remain 
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divided in terms of goals and views. As long as states are free to pursue their own foreign policy 
efforts, the alliance remains weak. While members, due to their unique situations may choose to 
develop and maintain partnerships with third actors, other members within the alliance may pursue 
different, sometimes conflicting, policies. Thus, the more members alliances decide to accept, the more 
outside issues emerge. 
Without a completely unified foreign policy outlook, the organization also struggles with the 
question of direction. As an offensive alliance, the organization must decide upon the crises in which it 
wishes to involve itself. However, in such instances, all voices are not equally heard. As members of 
NATO, states enjoy collective security. However, membership also brings the expectation that members 
will be willing to participate in all the organizations activities. If members were largely equal in size 
and diplomatic clout, issues may be more easily resolved. However, as long as alliances such as NATO 
continue to be dominated by larger states, smaller states remain at a disadvantage. They enjoy the 
collective security of the organization's defensive shield, but they may also be pressured into 
participating in crises with which they have little concern. Even if a new alliance to replace the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization were formed, smaller states would continue to be pressured by the larger 
members. Thus, members interested in organizations such as NATO must be willing to accept pressure 
from larger members in exchange for collective security. 
International organizations, such the European Union (EU), while different in nature, face some 
of the difficulties that NATO faces. Unlike NATO, the EU positions itself as a major economic actor. 
Created with largely the same basic purpose as NATO, the desire to achieve a more permanent peace in 
Europe, the EU has expanded and emerged as one of the most prominent economic actors on the 
international stage. Individually, the economies of the member-states of the organization represent 
some of the powerful in the world. Collectively, however, the unified economies become a much larger 
force. However, as with traditional military alliances, the emergence of a new major actor invites 
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opposition. Threatened by the new actor, the organization inspires the create of new regional, 
competing regional organizations and more hostile behavior from third parties. Such tensions between 
competing economic blocs may lead to economic conflicts, which will punish citizens residing within 
the territorial boundaries of the respective blocs. 
As with multi-lateral alliances, international organizations such as the EU struggle with issues 
of control. More specifically, efforts must be made to satisfy the the interests of all states participating 
in the organization. Efforts must be made to ensure that large states do not dominate the smaller states, 
while simultaneously ensuring that that large states are enabled with the influence they command due 
to the size of their populations and economies. Within the United States, issues are solved through a 
two-tiered legislative body. The European Union, as well as other regional unions, might work to 
develop such a system in order to ensure that the interests of all parties involved are more evenly and 
fairly represented. 
Regional organizations, such as the EU, are controversial for segments of those states which 
have joined, or wish to, as they require a partial sacrifice of state sovereignty in order to work most 
effectively. In order for economic integration to work, member-states must be willing to cede of their 
sovereignty to an un-elected supranational body. Initially, the EU emerged as a body intended for the 
promotion of peace through economic integration. However, the EU, as it has deepened and widened, 
has greatly expanded its reach to include many aspects of life. States do not cede all of their 
sovereignty, but they must increasingly accede to EU laws. 
In terms of international relations, the EU encounters the same problem as NATO with regards 
to unity among members. While the EU has a foreign secretary, the EU must come to an agreement 
before embarking upon a course of action. With each member-state maintaining its own secretary of 
foreign affairs, finding common ground among members. Thus, the EU struggles to be effective in the 
foreign policy arena. Achieving unanimity in the economic sphere represents less of a challenge than 
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reaching an agreement on the best path to pursue in terms of diplomatic relations. The divisions in the 
foreign policies of the individual states largely undermine the success of a common European foreign 
policy. 
Even when common ground may be found, confusion remembers. The European Union and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization largely, but not completely, overlap in terms of membership. Thus, 
as the EU attempts to assert itself as a diplomatic actor, it creates confusion for members of NATO.
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6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, alliances play a critical role in the establishment of certainty within the 
international system. Without certainty, states would be left alone to pursue foreign policy outcomes. 
While such a system may be stable, alliances are a proven means through which cooperation may be 
achieved, based on the preferences of the states participating in the agreement. The EU, unlike 
traditional bi- or multi-lateral alliances, acts as an effective peace-keeping mechanisms due to its ability 
to extract concessions from potential members. In extending the “carrot” of membership to various 
neighboring states, the EU may promote democracy and good governance in a largely effective manner. 
In fact, one might argue that the EU lacks any other tools through which it may inspire states to embark 
upon a true course of reform. Alliances come in various forms and are useful for pursuing various 
goals, but the EU has established itself as a model, however imperfect, for the future of inter-state 
cooperation. 
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